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THE DECISION OF THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTION 
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In Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) CC the Hungarian Constitutional Court introduced 
in the “vocabulary” of Hungarian Constitutional Law the concept of 
constitutional identity. The case was based on the request of the ombudsperson for 
abstract interpretation of the provisions of the Fundamental Law related to the 
implementation of EU Law, namely an EUC decision on the resettlement of 
asylum-seekers. While the Constitutional Court did not answer the question of the 
ombudsperson, it has expressed its position on ultra vires acts of the European 
Union in general terms. According to the Court, sovereignty of the state, 
protection of fundamental rights and constitutional identity can pose limits 
against the implementation of EU Law. Since then, the Seventh Amendment to the 
Fundamental Law (2018) included these requirements into the text of the 
constitution. The article offers a detailed overview and a critical analysis of the 
Decision of the Constitutional Court 
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Dans la Décision no 22/2016. (XII. 5.) CC la Cour constitutionnelle hongroise a 
introduit dans le „vocabulaire” du droit constitutionnel hongrois le concept 
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d’identité constitutionnelle. L’affaire a été initiée par une requête de l’ombudsperson 
sur l’interprétation abstraite des dispositions de la loi fondamentale relatives à 
l’application du droit de l’Union Européenne, plus précisément d’une Décision du 
Conseil de l’UE sur la relocation des demandeurs d’asyle. Tandis que la Cour 
constitutionnelle n’a pas répondu à la question adressée par l’ombudsperson, elle a 
exprimé sa position sur les actes ultra vires de l’Union Européenne dans des termes 
généraux. Selon la Cour, la souveraineté de l’Etat, la protection des droits 
fondamentaux et l’identité constitutionnelle peuvent mettre des limites à 
l’application du droit européen. Depuis la décision de la Cour, le Septième 
Amendment à la loi fondamentale (2018) a incorporées ces exigences dans la 
Constitution. Le présent article offre un regard détaillé et une analyse critique de 
la décision de la Cour constitutionnelle 
 
Mots-clés: identité constitutionnelle, protection de la souveraineté, réserve des 
droits fondamentaux, actes ultra vires, dialogue constitutionnel, interprétation 
constitutionnelle 
 
1. The Petition 
The Council Decision (EUC) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 (hereinafter: 
EUC Decision) established provisional measures in the area of international 
protection of asylum-seekers for the benefit of Italy and Greece. The EUC 
Decision prescribed the relocation of asylum-seekers from the 
abovementioned countries to other Member States. In the case of Hungary, 
the EUC Decision ordered the relocation of 1294 persons. According to the 
standpoint of the Commissioner for fundamental rights in Hungary (the 
ombudsperson) the process of the EUC Decision disregards the 
comprehensive examination of the individual circumstances of the 
applicants, is collective in nature and differs from the usual approach to 
fundamental rights protection mechanisms in the European Union. The 
ombudsperson (hereinafter: Petitioner) requested the abstract 
interpretation of certain provisions of the Fundamental Law of Hungary 
regard with the EUC Decision. 
The Petitioner filed his request on the examination of the Article XIV para. 
(1) and (2)1 and Article E) para. (2)2 of the Fundamental Law based on the 
                                                      
1 Article XIV.  
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Section 38 para. (1) of the Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court 
(hereinafter: the ACC). The questions and argumentation of the Petitioner 
were the following: 
(I.) Does the unconditional prohibition on the collective expulsion of 
foreigners, regulated in Article XIV (1) of the Fundamental Law, apply to 
the instrumental acts performed by the bodies or institutions of the 
Hungarian State as necessary for the implementation of an unlawful 
collective expulsion executed by another Member State, or only to those 
cases when foreigners must leave the territory of Hungary based on the 
decision of the Hungarian authorities? In this regard the Petitioner referred 
to the recommendations of international organizations and courts as well 
as provisions of international conventions which prescribe the prohibition 
of collective expulsion and the right to residence of the asylum-seekers 
until the final decision in their individual case. According to the Petitioner, 
the EUC Decision stands against the Dublin III. Regulation based on the 
individual selections of the applicants and the approval of the receiver 
state. According to the argumentation of the Petitioner, for executing the 
relocation from a Member State, the reception in another Member State is a 
necessary instrumental action. Therefore, if one state assists the unlawful 
act of the other, both states will be responsible for that procedure.  
The second question about the interpretation of Article E) para. (2) contains 
three parts: 
a. Are the state organs of Hungary, in accordance with Article E) para. (2) 
of the Fundamental Law, entitled or obliged to implement measures 
adopted in the framework of the inter-State cooperation achieved in the 
                                                                                                                                         
(1) Hungarian nationals shall not be expelled from the territory of Hungary and may return 
from abroad at any time. Foreigners residing in the territory of Hungary may only be 
expelled under a lawful decision. Collective expulsion shall be prohibited. 
(2) No one shall be expelled or extradited to a State where there is a risk that he or she would be 
sentenced to death, tortured or subjected to other inhuman treatment or punishment. 
2 Article E) 
(2) With a view to participating in the European Union as a Member State and on the basis 
of an international treaty, Hungary may, to the extent necessary to exercise the rights and 
fulfil the obligations deriving from the Founding Treaties, exercise some of its competences 
arising from the Fundamental Law jointly with other Member States, through the 
institutions of the European Union. 
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European Union if such measures are against the provisions of the 
Fundamental Law on fundamental rights? If it is possible to infer from the 
provisions of the Fundamental Law that Hungarian state organs are not 
entitled or obliged to implement such measures, then which Hungarian 
institution may declare that in a particular case? 
b. The second subquestion relates to the “ultra vires” acts of the European 
Union, those acts which are not based on a competence transferred by 
Hungary to the European Union on the basis of the Founding Treaties 
concluded with the other Member States. Is it possible to deduct from the 
provisions of the Fundamental Law that the Hungarian state organs are 
not entitled or obliged to implement such measures? If yes, which 
Hungarian institution may declare that fact? 
c. Can the provisions of Article E) and Article XIV of the Fundamental 
Law on the prohibition of collective expulsion be interpreted in a way of 
limiting Hungarian state organs in executing the provisions of the EUC 
decision? 
 
2. The Reasoning of the Constitutional Court’s Decision 
A. The Majority Opinion 
The Constitutional Court (hereinafter: CC) emphasized that the petition 
originates from the person entitled to file a motion and the request relates 
to a concrete provision of the Fundamental Law (hereinafter: FL). 
Moreover, the petition fits the requirements related to abstract 
constitutional interpretation as one of the competences of the CC: it 
concerns a concrete constitutional dispute and the interpretation can be 
directly deduced from the FL. The first question of the petitioner (on the 
interpretation of Article XIV) was separated by the CC from the question 
on the interpretation of Article E) - the reasoning focuses on the latter.  
Regarding the interpretation of Article E), the CC declared that the first 
and the second subquestions of the question are related to a concrete 
constitutional dispute which is in direct connection with the FL. However, 
the third subquestion can only be addressed by the CC in certain respects. 
According to the standpoint of the CC, the third subquestion can only be 
interpreted in the light of the first two problems, i.e. the context of 
fundamental rights reservation and the ultra vires acts, as this is the only 
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level of abstraction satisfying the condition of concreteness under Article 
38 (1) of ACC. With due regard to the above, the CC shall explain its 
response to the third subquestion included in its response to the first two.  
The CC declared that it is aware of the fact that, from the point of view of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union, the EU law is defined as an 
independent and autonomous legal order. However, the European Union 
is a legal community, and the core basis of this community are the 
international treaties concluded by the Member States. The CC quotes the 
decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht3 supporting the above statement. 
This decision declared that, as the contracting parties are the Member 
States, it is their national enforcement acts that ultimately determine the 
extent of primacy to be enjoyed by EU law against the relevant Member 
State's law.  
Furthermore, as the CC considers the constitutional dialogue within the 
European Union to be of primary importance it examined the positions 
taken by the Member States concerning ultra vires acts and the reservation 
of fundamental rights. 
According to the Supreme Court of Estonia, if it becomes evident that the 
new founding treaty of the European Union or the amendment to a 
founding treaty gives rise to a more extensive delegation of competence of 
Estonia to the European Union it is necessary to seek the approval of the 
holder of supreme (state) power.4 
According to the decision of the French Constitutional Council, the 
transposition of a Directive cannot run counter to a rule or principle 
inherent to the constitutional identity of France.5 
The Supreme Court of Ireland explained that without further amendment 
to the Constitution, any amendment to the Treaties shall be considered too 
broad.6 
The Constitutional Court of Latvia declared clearly that delegation of 
competences cannot counter the rule of law and the basic principle of an 
                                                      
3 BVerfGE 75, 223 [242]. 
4 Riigikohus, 12 July 2012, 3-4-1-6-12, 128, 223. 
5 Conseil Constitutionnel, No 2006-540 DC. 
6 Crotty v. An Taoiseach case (9 April 1987). 
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independent, sovereign and democratic republic based on the fundamental 
rights.7 
The Constitutional Court of Hungary examined several decisions of the 
Constitutional Tribunal of Poland. As established in one of these decisions, 
the accession of Poland to the European Union did not undermine the 
supremacy of the Constitution over the whole legal order within the field 
of sovereignty of the Republic of Poland.8 The primacy of the norms of EU 
regulations takes place in the event of their unconformity with statutes. By 
contrast, the Constitution retains its superiority and primacy over all legal 
acts which are in force in the Polish constitutional order, including the acts 
of EU law.9 Due to the status of the Constitution as the supreme law of the 
Republic of Poland, it is possible to examine whether the norms of EU 
regulations are consistent therewith.10 
As laid down by the Spanish Constitutional Court, the transfer of the 
exercise of competences to the European Union and the consequent 
integration of Community legislation in the Spanish legal system imposes 
unavoidable limits on the sovereign power of the State. This is acceptable 
only when European legislation is compatible with the fundamental 
principles of the social and democratic state and the rule of law, prescribed 
by the national Constitution. These substantive limits shall also be taken 
into consideration in the case of sovereignty-transfer defined in the 
Constitution.11 
Regarding the doctrine of primacy of the EU Law, the Constitutional Court 
of the Czech Republic established that its jurisdiction is restricted to a 
certain extent.12 In another decision, the Constitutional Court of the Czech 
Republic held that the transfer of powers to the organs of the European 
Union is valid till is in accordance with foundations of state sovereignty, 
including essential content.13 
In accordance with the requirement of constitutional dialogue between the 
Member States, in one of its decisions the Supreme Court of the United 
                                                      
7 Satversmes tiesa, 7 April 2009, 2008-35-01, 17. 
8 11 May 2005, K 18/04. 
9 11 May 2005, K 18/04. 
10 Case No SK 45/09 of 16 November 2011. 
11 Case No DTC 1/2004 of 13 December 2004. 
12 Case No Pl US 50/04 of 8 March 2006. 
13 Case No ÚS 19/08 of 26 November 2008. 
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Kingdom made a reference to a decision of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court. According to this, as part of a cooperative 
relationship between the Federal Constitutional Court and the European 
Court of Justice, the decision in question must not be read in a way which 
cannot question the identity of the Basic Law’s constitutional order."14  
The German Federal Constitutional Court explained in its decision on the 
Treaty of Lisbon that it always examines whether legal acts and 
instruments of the European institutions are within the boundaries of the 
sovereign powers accorded to them by way of conferral, whilst adhering to 
the principle of subsidiarity under Community and Union law. 
Furthermore, the Federal Constitutional Court examines whether the 
inviolable core content of the constitutional identity of the Basic Law is 
respected by way of these acts of the Union.15 
Based on the review of the case law of the Member States' supreme courts 
performing the tasks of constitutional courts and of the Member States' 
constitutional courts, the Constitutional Court established that within its 
own scope of competences, on the basis of a relevant petition, in 
exceptional cases and as a resort of ultima ratio, i.e. along with paying 
respect to the constitutional dialogue between the Member States, it can 
examine (a) whether exercising competences on the basis of Article E) para. 
(2) of the Fundamental Law results in the violation of human dignity or the 
essential content of any other fundamental right, (b) the sovereignty of 
Hungary and (c) the constitutional self-identity of Hungary. 
Regarding the reservation of fundamental rights, the Constitutional Court 
declared that any exercise of public authority in the territory of Hungary is 
linked to the fundamental rights: as the protection of fundamental rights is 
a primary obligation of the State, this shall precede the enforcement of any 
other state interest. As demonstrated in the opinion of the German 
Constitutional Court, detailed in the so called ‘Solange-decisions’, due to 
the institutional reforms, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Court 
of Justice of the European Union in most cases can grant the same level of 
protection for fundamental rights as the level secured by the national 
constitutions. However, the CC cannot set aside the ultima ratio protection 
of human dignity and the essential content of fundamental rights. 
                                                      
14 State v. Secretary of State for Transport, 22 January 2014. 
15 BverfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30 June 2009. 
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As regards the petitioner's motion related to transgressing the scope of 
competences, the CC notes that when the ultra vires nature of an act under 
EU law occurs, the Government, representing Hungary in the Council 
empowered to adopt legislation in the Union, may take the available 
steps.16 Furthermore, the National Assembly of Hungary or the 
Government of Hungary may file a claim with the Court of Justice of the 
European Union alleging the violation of the principle of subsidiarity by 
the legislative act of the European Union. In the following, the CC 
explicates that the joint exercise of competences, nevertheless, is not 
unlimited, as Article E) para. (2) of the Fundamental Law not only grants 
the validity of EU law in respect of Hungary, but at the same time it 
imposes limitations on the transferred and jointly exercised competences. 
On the one hand the joint exercise of a competence shall not violate 
Hungary's sovereignty (sovereignty control), and on the other hand it shall 
not lead to the violation of constitutional identity (identity control). 
Respecting and safeguarding the sovereignty of Hungary and its 
constitutional identity is an obligation of the National Assembly 
contributing to the European Union's decision-making mechanism and of 
the Government directly participating in that mechanism. However, 
according to Article 24 para (1) of the Fundamental Law, the main organ 
responsible for such protection is the Constitutional Court. The CC 
emphasizes that the direct subject of sovereignty- and identity control is 
not the legal act of the Union or its interpretation, therefore the Court shall 
not comment on the validity, invalidity or the primacy of application of 
such Union acts. 
As regards sovereignty control, the CC notes that it is based on Article B) 
of the Fundamental Law. According to the abovementioned article, in 
Hungary, the source of public power shall be the people, and power shall 
be exercised by the people through elected representatives or, in 
exceptional cases, directly. As long as Article B) of the Fundamental Law 
contains the principle of independent and sovereign statehood and 
indicates the people as the source of public power, these provisions shall 
not be emptied out by the Union-clause in Article E). Moreover, the CC 
                                                      
16 Based on Article 6 of the Protocol that forms an integral part of the Founding Treaties the 
National Assembly, and – in accordance with Article 16 para. (2) of TEU – the Government. 
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declares the principle of ‘maintained sovereignty.’17 Sovereignty has been laid 
down in the Fundamental Law as the ultimate source of competences and 
not as a competence. Therefore, the joint exercising of competences shall 
not result in depriving the people of the possibility of possessing the 
ultimate chance to control the exercise of public power.  
On the identity control, the CC notes the following: according to Article 4 
(2) TEU,18 the protection of constitutional identity should be granted in the 
framework of an informal cooperation with EUC based on the principles of 
equality and collegiality with mutual respect to each other. The 
Constitutional Court of Hungary interprets the concept of constitutional 
identity as part of Hungary's self-identity based on the overall 
Fundamental Law and certain provisions thereof, in accordance with the 
National Avowal and the achievements of the country’s historical 
constitution – as required by Article R) para. (3) of the Fundamental Law. 
The constitutional self-identity of Hungary is not a list of static and closed 
values, nevertheless many of its important components – identical with the 
constitutional values generally accepted – can be highlighted as examples: 
fundamental freedoms, the division of powers, republic as the form of 
government, respect of autonomies under public law, the freedom of 
religion, legally bound public power, parliamentarianism, the equality of 
rights, acknowledging judicial power, the protection of the national 
minorities. Moreover, achievements of the historical constitution can be 
mentioned, which the Fundamental Law and thus the whole Hungarian 
legal system are based upon. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court 
declares that the protection of constitutional self-identity may be raised in 
cases having an influence on the living conditions of the individuals, 
especially their privacy protected by fundamental rights, on their personal 
and social security, and on their decision-making responsibility, as well as 
when Hungary's linguistic, historical and cultural traditions are affected. 
The Constitutional Court declares that the constitutional self-identity of 
                                                      
17 As by joining the European Union, Hungary has not surrendered its sovereignty, it rather 
allowed for the joint exercise of certain competences, the maintenance of Hungary's 
sovereignty shall be presumed when examining the joint exercise of further competences, 
additional to the rights and obligations provided in the Founding Treaties of the European 
Union. See: Decision 22/2016 (XII. 5.) CC [60]. 
18 The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their 
national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, 
inclusive of regional and local self-government. 
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Hungary is a fundamental value acknowledged but not created by the 
Fundamental Law. Consequently, constitutional identity cannot be waived 
by way of an international treaty – Hungary can only be deprived of its 
constitutional identity through the final termination of its sovereignty. 
Therefore, the protection of constitutional identity shall remain the duty of 
the Constitutional Court until such time as Hungary is a sovereign State. 
Accordingly, sovereignty and constitutional identity have several common 
points thus their control shall be performed with due regard to each other 
in specific cases. 
On the Petitioner's question related to the implementation of the EUC 
Decision by the Hungarian state organs the CC gives an abstract answer. If 
human dignity, another fundamental right, the sovereignty of Hungary 
(including the extent of the transferred competences) or its self-identity 
based on its historical constitution can be presumed to be violated due to 
the exercise of competences based on Article E) para. (2) of the 
Fundamental Law, the CC may examine based on a relevant petition, in the 
course of exercising its competences, the existence of the alleged violation. 
 
B. Concurring Opinions and Dissenting Opinions 
Egon Dienes-Oehm agrees with the CC with regard to the assessments 
expressed in the decision related to the joint exercise of competences and 
declaring the general designation of its review competence. However, 
according to his standpoint, the reasoning does not give an exhaustive list 
of the limitations in concrete cases of the review competence, which is 
therefore specified in general terms, allowing for several potential 
interpretations in this respect. In his concurring opinion he gives a 
summary of the limitations originating from the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU), the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the 
Fundamental Law and the Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court 
(ACC). 
First, he points out that the petition aimed at establishing the ultra vires 
nature of the Union's legal act can only result in an obligation of review by 
the Constitutional Court with temporal limitations. Furthermore, he notes 
that any legal debate after the adoption of a piece of EU legislation falls 
exclusively into the scope of competence of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) in accordance with Article 344 of TFEU. It is a 
question to be addressed independently, what are the conditions upon 
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which the Member States' constitutional courts or supreme courts can still 
play a role in preventing the transgressing of competences. In his opinion, 
the CC shall not review the judicial acts of the Union either. 
Furthermore, he declares that as the sources of EU law directly enforceable 
in the Member States without any legislative measure taken by the 
Member States are not "legal regulations" according to the Fundamental 
Law19 and the ACC.20 These cannot form the subject matter of preliminary 
or posterior review, and the same applies to constitutional complaints as 
well. Consequently, he holds that the possibility of reviewing EU 
legislation of ultra vires nature can only be based upon Section 38 (1) of 
ACC (abstract interpretation of the provisions of the Fundamental Law). 
He accepts the principle of maintained sovereignty with the interpretation 
that it can be regarded as a procedural requirement providing guidance for 
the Constitutional Court's future activity in the field of sovereignty-control. 
It can play a role during the constitutional review in the case of 
transferring new (further) competences for joint exercise. He also notes that 
the cases where this requirement is applicable can be only exceptional 
situations. He refers as examples to the development of EU law regulations 
in the field of expected future policies related to border control, asylum 
and immigration. 
According to the standpoint of Imre Juhász, separating the petitioner's 
claim on interpreting Article XIV of the Fundamental Law is questionable 
especially in the light of the fact that the EUC Decision is applicable to the 
persons who arrive(d) to the territory of Italy or Greece between 25 
September 2015 and 26 September 2017, as well as to those applicants who 
have arrived to the territory of the Member States since 24 March 2015. 
In his opinion, the level of protection of fundamental rights as secured by 
the law of the European Union should have been analyzed more deeply, on 
the basis of Hungarian constitutionality. He holds that the fundamental 
rights' protection level of the European Union cannot be specified in an 
exact way, and the present state of fundamental rights' protection is not 
without debates and it rises questions that are yet unanswered. According 
to the standpoint of Mr. Juhász, the force of the Beneš-decrees based on the 
principle of collective guilt, the application of a ‘double standard’ in 
                                                      
19 Article 24 para. (2) of the Fundamental Law. 
20 Sections 23–31 of ACC. 
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fundamental rights disputes in the case of states which became Member 
States earlier and the ones which joined the Union later are obvious 
examples for the issue detailed above. Therefore, his conclusion is that 
making any, not adequately matured statement about presuming the 
sufficient ("at least adequate") level of fundamental rights' is misleading. 
In his concurring opinion, Béla Pokol emphasizes that the CC in its 
decision missed a more elaborate consideration of the experiences gained 
by the European constitutional courts. According to him, the essential 
problem is that the domestic actions of protecting sovereignty and 
constitutional identity by the constitutional courts against the legal acts of 
the Union have been institutionalized in each country in two phases: 
establishing in the country concerned the mechanism of taking action as an 
abstract possibility is separated from the decision on declaring the 
prohibition of application against the concrete act of the Union. 
Furthermore, the rejection of the application of a legal act of the Union can 
cause diplomatic consequences which are out of the competence of the CC.  
This is the reason why he stresses that the Government shall have the 
exclusive right to turn to the CC. This way, the commencement of the CC’s 
procedure would always be preceded by the preliminary examination of 
an appropriate foreign policy expert staff, relieving the judges of the CC of 
the burden of considering the potential disadvantages that may affect the 
country because of their decision. 
According to the concurring opinion of István Stumpf, the CC is an 
authentic interpreter of the Fundamental Law. Consequently, the CC can 
review and declare the unconstitutionality of the ultra vires acts in the 
context of the independent and democratic State under the rule of law 
[Article B) para (1) of the Fundamental Law] and the exercise of 
competences transferred to the European Union [Article E) para. (2) of the 
Fundamental Law] ("integration reservation"). 
According to the standpoint of Mr. Stumpf, the CC made an evident 
decision regarding its competence. Article E) para. (2) of the Fundamental 
Law settles the joint exercise of powers jointly with other Member States, 
therefore those legal acts which are enacted based on the authorization of 
the Fundamental Law, cannot be contrary to the Fundamental Law itself. 
At the same time, Article E) para. (2) of the Fundamental Law does not 
contain any provisions on the nature of EU law, its relation to the legal 
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system of Hungary, its force and its application, consequently, it does not 
qualify as an integration clause of European law.  
According to the holdings of the decision "the CC may examine upon a 
relevant motion – in the course of exercising its competences – whether the 
joint exercise of powers under Article E) para. (2) of the Fundamental Law 
would violate" the Fundamental Law. Looking at the competences of the 
CC specified in Article 24 para. (2) of the Fundamental Law, one may find 
that the legislator defined clearly the subject of review regarding each 
procedure of the CC: legal regulation or judicial decision. According to the 
relevant provisions of ACC, all types of constitutional complaints can only 
be submitted in the case of the violation of a right granted in the 
Fundamental Law; abstract constitutional values, such as the ‘sovereignty 
of Hungary’ or its ‘identity based on the country's historical constitution’ 
cannot form the basis of a petition. In his opinion, the CC can perform the 
protection of Hungary's sovereignty and constitutional identity when – for 
example at the time of amending a Founding Treaty – the empowered 
bodies of the Hungarian State request a review about the competence 
transfer to the bodies of the Union, whether it could be in conformity with 
the Fundamental Law. 
He also declares that the CC - contrary to its expressed intention – 
implicitly examines the validity of European Law by declaring their ultra 
vires nature.  
According to the relevant part of the majority decision on sovereignty 
control (Reasoning [58]–[60]), ‘the joint exercise of competences shall not 
result in depriving the people of the possibility of possessing the ultimate 
chance to control the exercise of public power (realized either in joint or in 
individual – Member State – form)’. Mr. Stumpf doubts the accuracy of this 
statement as in certain cases – taking the national referendum as an 
example – it is the Fundamental Law itself which limits the possibility of 
the people to control the activity of public institutions. Similarly, the 
statement of the majority decision could hardly mean that in individual 
cases voters could review the measures taken by the bodies of the 
European Union. He also considers the following statement of the majority 
decision unacceptable: ‘The protection of constitutional self-identity may 
be raised in the cases having an influence on the living conditions of the 
individuals, in particular their privacy protected by fundamental rights, on 
their personal and social security, and on their decision-making 
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responsibility’. This statement has been taken without proper examination 
of the circumstances from the decision of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court,21 quoted earlier in the reasoning, in the absence of 
any argument based on the Fundamental Law of Hungary. He also stands 
against the approach that would tear apart the notion of Hungary's 
constitutional identity from the text of the Fundamental Law, creating a 
kind of ‘invisible Fundamental Law’ to be protected by the CC.  
András Varga Zs. highlights in his concurring opinion refers to the notion 
of constitutional identity prescribed in the majority opinion ass an 
immutable constitutional value. According to his standpoint, the value of 
the constitutional self-identity is not a universal legal value, rather a set of 
peculiarities of the nations and the communities belonging to the nations. 
In the case of Hungary, the values which constitute this self-identity are 
results of the achievements of the historical constitution, therefore it is not 
possible to ignore them. 
Regarding the European Union, one may conclude that Hungary's 
constitutional self-identity had existed even before the country’s accession 
to the Union as a Member State. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court 
should interpret strictly the presumption of the ‘maintenance of 
sovereignty’. If there are arguments in favor of keeping the exercise of a 
competence within the sovereignty of the Member country, then it should 
be presumed that Hungary has not transferred the competence to the 
European Union, even when there are other arguments in favor of such 
transfer.  
László Salamon holds that the majority decision of the CC is unsatisfactory 
and fails to provide a complete answer to the questions aimed at the 
interpretation of the Constitution, as asked by the commissioner for 
fundamental rights. The question of the petitioner was aimed at finding 
out whether the bodies and the institutions of the State of Hungary are 
entitled or obliged to implement measures adopted in a competence 
exercised jointly with the other Member States of the European Union if 
such measures are against the provisions of the Fundamental Law of 
Hungary regarding the contents of fundamental rights. He holds that 
violating the provisions of the Fundamental Law on fundamental rights is 
prohibited - an essential part of the possible answer to the above question 
of the petitioner.  
                                                      
21 BverfG, 2 BvE 2/08, 30 June 2009. 
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Another question of the petitioner was substantially aimed at finding out 
whether the enforcement of the Union legal act is affected by the fact of 
being adopted in the absence of competence, i.e. ultra vires. He notes that 
the CC should have given a more detailed interpretation regarding this 
question emphasizing that the competence to stand against the 
enforcement of the ultra vires legal acts shall have been declared not only in 
the case of the CC, rather in the case of other state organs as well. 
Finally, the dissenting judge declares that the procedures to be followed by 
state organs, as well as their attitude towards the situations mentioned 
above cannot be linked to a preliminary procedure of the CC. For that 
matter, this is neither expressly stated, nor contested by the decision itself. 
 
3. The Decision and the Ratio Decidendi  
The Constitutional Court declared that it can examine whether the joint 
exercise of competence based on the Article E) para. (2) violates a) the 
human dignity or another fundamental rights, b) the sovereignty of 
Hungary or c) the self-identity of Hungary based on its historical 
constitution.  
 
4. The Criticism of the Reasoning 
The Constitutional Court refers to the requirements of the abstract 
interpretation of the Fundamental Law, namely, having a concrete 
constitutional issue and the interpretation to be directly deduced from the 
Fundamental Law. However, the CC does not make a detailed 
interpretation of the abovementioned requirements. The reasoning of the 
decision contains only one statement, noting that these questions are 
clearly considered as constitutional issues.22 The method of the analysis 
should have been also clarified based on the Decision 17/2013. (VI. 26.) 
CC23: “Based on this competence abstract interpretation of the 
Fundamental Law only concrete questions are acceptable which can be 
answered based only on constitutional reasoning and the interpretation of 
                                                      
22 Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) CC [31]. 
23 This decision underlines that “the role of abstract interpretation of the provisions of the 
Fundamental Law does not differ from the particularities of the same competence based on 
the former constitution.” See: Decision: 17/2013. (VI. 26.) CC [7]. 
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the Fundamental Law left out any other law.”24 If the abovementioned 
methodological requirements were declared and applied specifically to this 
case, we should get a more precise point of reference for the analysis of the 
Constitutional Court’s reasoning. 
It should also be underlined that the CC did not offer a detailed reasoning 
for separating the question on the interpretation of Article XIV of the 
Fundamental Law (the constitutional prohibition of the expulsion) from 
the other questions. The reasoning contains only a simple explanation that 
the separated interpretation is reasonable.25 Referring to the 
reasonableness, the Court said that it is in conformity with the provisions 
of the ACC.26 However, it would be useful to know the substantive reasons 
related to the separated interpretation. In this regard, one constitutional 
and one political reason can be recalled. A relevant constitutional 
consideration could be that the CC wanted to specifically emphasize its 
statements regarding fundamental rights reservation, sovereignty control 
and identity control. The political – and therefore not explicit - reason can 
be that the CC did not wish to deal with the constitutional context of the 
applicability of the 2015/1601 EUC Decision resolution that served as a 
basis for the questionable27 and invalid “quota referendum” and ultimately 
the unsuccessful submission of the amendment to the Fundamental Law. 
According to the CC, the third question regarding Article E) (on the 
applicability of the unconditional prohibition of the collective expulsion of 
foreigners’ in the case of the planned relocation of asylum-seekers, based 
on the EUC decision) can be answered only in certain aspects. The matters 
of fundamental rights reservation, sovereignty control and identity control 
– based on the further statements of the reasoning – are not defined by the 
subject of the case, rather shall be answered on a more general level. This is 
the primary approach of the CC taken in the decision. 
The CC recalls two relevant and opposing views regarding the question on 
the enforcement of the EU law. According to the standpoint of the CJEU, 
                                                      
24 Decision 17/2013. (VI. 26.) CC [11]. 
25 Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB [29]. 
26 See: Article 58 (3) of ACC. 
27 About the critical approach see: Zoltán Pozsár-Szentmiklósy, A Kúria végzése a betelepítési 
kvótáról szóló népszavazási kérdésről. Országgyűlési hatáskör az európai jog homályában [The 
Decision of the Curia on the national referendum on refugee quotas.. Competence of the 
National Assembly in the Gloom the EU Law.], in (2016) 1-2 Jogesetek Magyarázata, p. 77-84. 
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the EU legislation is an independent, autonomous legal system which has 
priority over national legal systems. However, the community of the 
European Union is finally based on the treaties concluded by the Member 
States. Therefore, these treaties necessarily restrict the enforcement of the 
EU law. One can add that the reasoning of the CC is somewhat misleading 
regarding the second approach stating formally that the Member States are 
“the rulers of the treaties”. It is a more relevant question is in this regard 
that the substance of international treaties concluded between the Member 
States and the rules of the constitutions indicate the room of manoeuvre for 
the EU as a community of law.  
It is remarkable that the CC – responsively on the approaches of 
transnational courts and academic works – refers to the concept of the 
constitutional dialogue when it reviews the standpoints of the Member 
States regarding ultra vires acts and fundamental right reservation. 
However, the only result of this research and detailed presentation of 
diverse sources is an unsought monologue: the CC only presents the 
relevant practice of the foreign courts. The in-depth analysis of the 
presented approaches, and the application of these in Hungarian context 
are missing. Consequently, “the interaction of constitutional organs of 
equal position” is missing from the conceptual elements of the 
constitutional dialogue which could otherwise support “the identification 
of the most accurate constitutional content.”28 One can add that the 
detailed presentation of the practice of Member States can only have an 
additional function because it cannot support the substantive reasoning. 
This is regrettable because this case gave a unique possibility for the CC to 
take part substantively in the European constitutional dialogue.  
The lack of discussion is even more obvious when the CC makes its 
statements after the overview of the practices of other Member States and 
the CJEU. The statements of the decision are supplemented with the ultima 
ratio argument and the respect for the constitutional discussion between 
Member States. On the other hand, the explanation is completely missing 
regarding the measure to which the practices of Member States support or 
confute the possibility of fundamental rights reservation, sovereignty 
protection and identity protection, or even the ultima ratio argument. The 
                                                      
28 See: Tímea Drinóczi, Jogrendszerek versenye és alkotmányos párbeszéd [The Competition of 
Legal Systems and the Constitutional Dialogue], in (2016) 2 Iustum Aequum Salutare,  
pp. 213-233. 216. 
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reader may have a sense of lacking in the sense, that although the 
previously examined questions were dealing with two concepts 
(fundamental rights reservations and ultra vires legal acts), in the 
conclusion the concepts of sovereignty and identity also appear. According 
to the latter, more detailed reasons are included in other parts of the 
decision. 
The statement of the CC on the fundamental rights reservation could be the 
easiest reasoning task – a possible reason why the related, relatively short 
part of the reasoning does not contain any special effort. The most 
important statement of the CC is a constitutional axiom which declares that 
that any exercise of public authority on the territory of Hungary (including 
the joint exercise of competences with other Member States) is bound by 
fundamental rights. This statement can be supported by a historical 
overview, confirmed by theory and prevailing in practice, namely the 
classic concept of the fundamental rights, according to which fundamental 
rights protect the autonomy of the individual against the public authority. 
The CC did not express the abovementioned correlation, rather only 
interpreted a single norm of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, Article I 
para. (1) which declares that the protection of the fundamental rights is the 
primary obligation of the State. The “primary obligation” is the point of 
view which leads the CC to the statement that the protection of 
fundamental rights overtakes other obligations of the state including the 
obligation based on the membership in the European Union. 
It's understandable that the CC did not base its reasoning on a detailed 
exposition of conceptual features of fundamental rights, but on the text of 
the Fundamental Law. This way the CC was not forced to take a stance in 
the multifarious debate on the priority of fundamental rights against the 
majoritarian decisions based on democratic representation.29 No doubt, 
                                                      
29 Bruce Ackerman created an easily applicable typology in this context: the Author makes a 
difference between the theory that argues for the normative priority of fundamental rights, 
the monistic perception of the democracy that highlights the role of majority decisions 
based on a democratic procedure and the dualistic model of democracy. The essential 
feature of the latter theory is the distinction between two levels of the community decisions: 
in the “normal mode” of politics the majority decision has priority, while in “the 
exceptional moments of the constitutional politics” it is necessary to gain the support of the 
vast majority of the community (among them the minority). See: Tamás Győrfi, A többségi 
döntés tartalmi korlátai és az alkotmánybíráskodás [The limits of the majority decision and 
constitutional adjudication], in A. Jakab, A. Körösényi, Alkotmányozás Magyarországon és 
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from the concept of "primary obligation" it is possible to reach to the 
conclusion on the priority status of fundamental rights, which is 
accordingly interpretable within the structure of hierarchy of norms30 as 
well. However, a more convincing argumentation can be formed based on 
the provision of Article I para. (3) of the Fundamental Law, which defines 
the rules related to the possible limitations of fundamental rights, stating 
the protection of the essential (core) content of these. From provision31 
follows in a compelling way that the essential content of fundamental 
rights enjoys a comprehensive protection against all acts of public 
authorities (including the legislation of Hungarian constitutional organs, 
legislation by the way of the EU community of law, and the 
implementation of these legislations). 
From the substantive point of view, the CC basically relies on the decisions 
of the Bundesverfassungsgericht32 when declaring that the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court has a reviewing competence on the law of the 
European Union, considering at the same time the enforcement of the EU 
law. The most important and independent statement of the CC is when it 
declares that “the state cannot set aside the ultima ratio protection of human 
dignity and the essential content of fundamental rights”.33 However, the 
CC did not support the abovementioned statement with substantive 
arguments, it just declared it. According to our standpoint, the conclusion 
is correct, but the detailed reasoning could strengthen the normative power 
of this statement. It would be enough to demonstrate that the human 
dignity is conceptually unrestrictable as a legal status which protects the 
                                                                                                                                         
máshol. Politikatudományi és alkotmányjogi megközelítések [Constitution-making in Hungary 
and elsewhere. Approaches of Political Science and Constitutional Law] (Budapest: MTA 
TK Politikatudományi Intézet – Új Mandátum Kiadó, 2012), pp 33-57. 
30 For the possible meaning of the concept see: László Sólyom, Normahierarchia az 
Alkotmányban [Hierarchy of Norms in the Constitution], in (2014) 1 Közjogi Szemle, pp. 1-7. 
31 Taking into consideration the abstractness of the notions and their connections with other 
rules of Constitutional Law, the systematic interpretation leads the easiest way to this 
conclusion. For this, there is a need for previous knowledge on the notions to interpret and 
also keeping in mind the integrity of the constitution. Regarding the interpretation methods 
see: Lóránt Csink, Johanna Fröchlich, Egy alkotmány margójára. Alkotmányelméleti és 
értelmezési kérdések az Alaptörvényről [To the margin of a constitution. Questions of 
constitutional theory and constitutional interpretation related to the Fundamental Law] 
(Budapest: Gondolat, 2012), pp. 73-75. 
32 Solange I, Solange II, 2 BvR 2735/14. 
33 Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB 49 
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entire personality of the individual.34 This statement is also true in the case 
of the essential (core) content of fundamental rights: the constituent power 
sets limits for the future restriction of those rights to ensure the protection 
of the immanent content of these.35 
Consequently, recalling of the absolute protection of the fundamental 
rights is convincing. However, the reader easily may have a sense of 
lacking in the sense: the constitutional prohibitions based on human 
dignity36 and the safeguards of constitutional criminal law37 could be also 
mentioned in this regard. Emphasizing the ultima ratio nature can be a 
gesture for the priority clam of the EU law. However, the abovementioned 
statement does not have relevance in the case of absolute rights: public 
authorities have a constitutional obligation to protect these rights even if 
they do not act on an ultima ratio basis. 
Regarding the ultra vires acts, the CC emphasizes that the National 
Assembly (based on Article 6 of the Protocol of the founding treaties) and 
the Government (based on the Article 16 of the EUT) can also take the 
necessary steps. Moreover, the reasoning mentions the opportunity to file a 
petition to the CJEU regarding the violation of subsidiarity by a legal act. 
The abovementioned reasoning also enforces the ultima ratio nature of the 
actions taken by the CC which– taking into consideration its previous 
practice – is by no means surprising. The reason behind the careful 
reasoning of the CC is that, while after the ratification of Lisbon Treaty 
most of the European countries tried to declare38 the core of their existence 
as sovereign states that cannot be affected by the European integration, the 
                                                      
34 The human dignity – jointly with the right to life – was graded as an “absolute value” by 
the Constitutional Court already in the decision 23/1990. (X. 31.) CC See: Decision 23/1990. 
(X. 31.) AB; ABH 1990. 88-114. 93. 
35 For the definition of the essential content of fundamental rights see: Zoltán Pozsár-
Szentmiklósy, Megismerhető-e az alapjogok lényeges tartalma? [Is it possible to identify the 
essential content of fundamental rights?], in (2013) 12 Magyar Jog, pp. 714-722. 
36 See the prohibition of torture in Article III of the Fundamental Law. 
37 The picture can be more diverse when taking into consideration the theory of Gábor 
Halmai and Gábor Attila Tóth. In their perception, the safeguards of Criminal 
Constitutional Law acknowledged by the Constitutional Court are absolute rights which 
gained their status as a result of a balancing. See: Gábor Halmai, Gábor Attila Tóth, Az 
emberi jogok korlátozása [The limitation of human rights], in G. Halmai, G. Attila Tóth (Eds.): 
Emberi jogok Human rights (Budapest: Osiris, 2003), pp. 111-112. 
38 See summarized in “The Reasoning of the Decision” part the decisions cited by the 
Constitutional Court. 
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Constitutional Court of Hungary did not make any definite and clear 
decision regarding the abovementioned question. One can add that the CC 
previously dealt with more cases which affected its competence regarding 
the examination of the EU law.39 Another reason for the emphasis on the 
ultima ratio nature is the sensitivity of the subject. The examination of the 
EU law by the constitutional courts of the Member States, a possible 
decision on the non-conformity of the EU norm with the national 
constitution and the declaration of its inapplicability would have 
unpredictable consequences regarding the legal enforcement and political 
dimension of the EU law. 40  
The statement of the CC that “respecting and safeguarding the sovereignty 
of Hungary and its constitutional identity is an obligation for everybody” 
refers to the organs of the European Union as well as the Hungarian public 
authorities. The notion of the protection against the integration is based on 
the national identity concept of Article 4 para. (2) of the TEU. However, 
regarding to the related obligations of the Government and the National 
Assembly, misses from the reasoning the reference to the textual basis of 
the Hungarian Fundamental Law. A statement affecting the national 
sovereignty to this degree, will definitely create a sense of lack in the 
absence of the proper constitutional basis. The insufficiency of the 
abovementioned statement can be reduced to some extent by the 
concurring opinion of András Varga Zs. who refers to the unchangeable 
values created by the historical evolution of the constitution. The 
protecting function of the constitutional self-identity will be concerned by 
this article in connection with the critics of the identity control.  
The statement of the CC regarding ultra vires legal acts, declaring that the 
subjects of sovereignty or identity control are not directly made up by EU 
legal acts, therefore it will not make any decision in this regards, also raises 
questions. We do agree with István Stumpf's stance expressed in his 
concurring opinion, because the statements on the ultra vires acts as taken 
in the lack of competence - i.e. extended beyond the joint exercise of 
                                                      
39 See Decision 17/2004 (V. 25.) CC, Decision 744/B/2004 CC and Decision 143/2010. (VII. 14.) 
CC. 
40 Regarding the connection models of the EU law and the law of the Member States see: 
László Blutman, Nóra Chronowski, Az Alkotmánybíróság és a közösségi jog: alkotmányjogi 
paradoxon csapdájában (II.) [The Constitutional Court and the EU Law: in the trap of a 
constitutional paradox], in (2007) 4 Európai Jog, pp. 14-28. 
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competence based on the Article E) para. (2) - immanently contains the 
declaration of the invalidity of the norm. One can add that without taking 
into consideration the EU source of law it is difficult to conduct 
sovereignty and identity control in specific cases. The external protection, 
that is the compliance to the limits to integration after setting these 
potential limits, can only be realized with the close inspection of EU legal 
acts. Therefore, this statement of the CC needs further explanation to 
achieve unambiguity. These criteria are also an implicit resolution with 
regards to the competence of the CC in examining EU law: instead of 
deciding this delicate question, it only hints at the majority stance, 
according to which the CC cannot declare a legal act of the EU invalid or 
inapplicable in Hungary. In any case, the phrasing leaves a lot of room to 
maneuver with further interpretations. 
Regarding the sovereignty control, the essential statement of the CC is that 
the joint exercise of competence based on Article E) cannot empty Article 
B) of the Fundamental Law: the independent national sovereignty and 
popular sovereignty. The CC used in its reasoning the term of 
“sovereignty” without specifying it (national sovereignty or popular 
sovereignty). Later it solved the problem with the association of the two 
principles when declaring that the people shall not be deprived of the 
possibility of possessing the ultimate chance to control the exercise of 
public power.41 Another doctrinal statement is the definition of the 
principle of “maintained sovereignty” According to the standpoint of the 
CC, the sovereignty is not a competence but it is defined as the final source 
of the competences. Consequently, the country can only transfer 
competences but not sovereignty to the European Union.42 Along with the 
abovementioned statement, the principle of “maintained sovereignty” may 
seem contradictory because the denomination of the theory mentions the 
sovereignty and its maintenance against the transfer of competence in the 
reasoning. Consequently, the two concepts are not clearly separated. 
According to the related literature, it is also debated whether the final 
                                                      
41 Tímea Drinóczi, A 22/2016 (XII. 5.) AB határozat: mit (nem) tartalmaz, és mi következik belőle. 
Az identitásvizsgálat és az ultra vires közös hatáskörgyakorlás összehasonlító elemzésben. [What 
contains and what does not the Decision 22/2016 (XII. 5.) CC? Analysis of the identity 
examination and the ultra vires joint exercise of competences in a comparative perspective], 
in (2017) 1 MTA Law Working Papers, p. 13. 
42 See András Varga Zs., Végleges szuverenitás, vagy korlátozott hatáskör-transzfer? [Final 
sovereignty or restricted transfer of competence?], in (2016) 1 Fontes Iuris. 
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decision, the ultimate source of power or the joint exercise of competence 
shall be taken into consideration. Moreover, if it is about the joint exercise 
of competences, it is a further challenge to identify the limits of these to be 
taken into consideration for the functioning international cooperation.43 
According to the principle of maintained sovereignty there can be also 
criticized that it cannot give an appropriate answer to the question related 
to the further competences. Can the CC examine only the competences 
which are going to be transferred later or it can also examine the already 
transferred competences?44 The ultra vires acts can be graded as legal acts 
which are extended beyond the rights declared in treaties. Consequently, 
these can be graded as “further joint exercise of competences” without any 
reasoning problems. In the light of the above, the sovereignty control 
cannot be used only in case of the future transfer of competences. Based on 
the reasoning and the majority opinion, at least according to our 
standpoint, the opposite can be stated.  
The reasoning about the identity control starts with the reference to Article 
4. para. (2) TEU which contains word for word the phrase of national 
identity not the constitutional identity. This reference itself can show that 
in the Hungarian constitutional system the theory of constitutional identity 
is can be linked to a content which is closer to national identity. The 
solution, that the CC bases its reasoning on the Article 4. para. (2) TEU and 
uses this reference to fix the borders against the integration on the basis 
national identity, can be also found in the practice of the other Member 
States’ constitutional courts.45 However, the majority opinion does not 
sufficiently explain the nature of the connection and possible differences 
between the concepts of national identity and constitutional identity. The 
further reasoning of the majority opinion also does not contain the 
complete definition of the constitutional identity, only the frames for the 
interpretation of the theory and specifies a few examples. Regarding the 
content of the notion, András Varga Zs. points out in his concurring 
                                                      
43 Tímea Drinóczi, A párbeszéd hatása az állami szuverenitásra [The effect of the dialogue on 
national sovereignty], in (2014) 27 MTA Law Working Papers, p. 16. 
44 This statement is against of Egon Dienes-Oehm’s concurring opinion that notes that he 
can accept the presumption of maintained sovereignty only in the case of examination of 
competences which are going to be transferred in the future.  
45 See summarized in “The Reasoning of the decision” part the decisions recalled by the 
Constitutional Court. 
 322 ZOLTÁN POZSÁR-SZENTMIKLÓSY, VERONIKA KÉRI 
opinion that the constitutional self-identity is not the group of the universal 
rights, but it is a value which is specific for specified nations settled by a 
community and makes them different from the others. Justice Varga Zs. 
explains with the abovementioned statement the missing (but deducible 
from the EU context) thesis of the majority opinion that the national 
identity and the constitutional self-identity cannot be separated in 
Hungary. 
The definition of the CC is a frame for interpretation to be used in the 
future to define the values which form identity. This frame is based on the 
reference to Article R) para. (3) of Fundamental Law.46 Based on this, the 
CC is going to identify values that are the part of the constitutional identity 
referring to the National Avowal, the achievements the historical 
constitution, the provisions of the Fundamental Law and the purpose of 
these. In this regard, it is important to note that in the provisions of Article 
R) are obligatory for the interpretation of constitution, not only in the case 
of the constitutional identity but in every procedure regarding the 
interpretation of the Fundamental Law. Consequently, this reference does 
not help to get closer to the content of the constitutional identity.47 The 
main problem of this approach is that it linked a hardly definable doctrine 
that is novel for the Hungarian constitutional system to an uncertain and 
recently used concept. One can add that there are more questions than 
answers regarding the achievements of historical constitution in the related 
literature and in the practice of the Constitutional Court.48  
Furthermore, the argument reveals that Hungary's constitutional identity 
is not a system of static and close values. This is followed by a list of 
example values that belong to this circle. At this point, we have to note that 
                                                      
46 Article R) para. (3) The provisions of the Fundamental Law shall be interpreted in 
accordance with their purposes, the National Avowal contained therein and the 
achievements of our historic constitution. 
47 Regarding the questions related to Article R) para. (3), especially the achievements of 
historical constitution as reasoning standards, see: Imre Vörös, A történeti alkotmány az 
Alkotmánybíróság gyakorlatában [The historical constitution in the practice of the 
Constitutional Court], in (2016) 4 Közjogi Szemle, pp. 44-57. 
48 Ibid.; Attila Horváth, Az alkotmányozáshoz. A magyar történeti alkotmány tradíciói [For the 
Constitution-making. The tradition of the Hungarian historical constitution], in (2011) 1 
Alkotmánybírósági Szemle; András Jakab, Az Alaptörvény keletkezése és gyakorlati 
következményei. The creation of the Fundamental Law and its practical consequences, in 
(2011) HVG-ORAC, p. 198. 
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there is a dissonance between emphasizing of the unique nature of 
constitutional identity (standing implicitly on the ground of national 
identity) and the almost solely universal values present in the list.49 This is 
most likely because in the example list the CC only included values that 
are beyond dispute, which are even though Hungarian and therefore their 
historical constitutional traditions are beyond dispute, do not bear the 
marks national identity. The root of the problem lies in the fact that 
according to the CC's previously discussed argument, all must respect 
Hungary's constitutional identity. This requirement, based on Article 4 
TEU, applies to EU decision making mechanism on one hand, but at the 
same time it also applies to the highest national institutions of the 
Hungarian state. In our view, the CC could have solved the controversy 
mentioned above by unambiguously defining the two directions of identity 
protection, namely: the limit set up against the EU50 in favor of the national 
identity protection of Member States, including the action taken against the 
ultra vires nature of EU legal acts; as well as the internal restriction in the 
constitutional system i.e. the protection against the actions of supreme 
governmental institutions. This would be an extraordinarily important 
distinction because the universal values listed, like "the division of powers" 
for example, could hardly be a reference basis in, for example, the 
argument based on Article 4 of EUT which implies the invocation of 
national identity, so something specifically unique and only concerning 
that particular nation. Nonetheless, we can't find any notion in the example 
list that would show a close relationship with national identity.51 In the 
defense of the CC, solving this issue proves to be extraordinarily difficult: 
it would take the CC to undertake the definition of national identity 
beyond the scope of law. On the other hand, it can be stated that the 
universal values listed in the decision fall well within the Hungarian 
constitutional system and, according to the above argument, should be 
compulsorily respected by the government and parliament. 
                                                      
49 “fundamental rights, the separation of powers, the republic as the form of the 
government, respect of autonomies in public law, freedom of religion, legally bound 
exercise of power, parliamentarianism, equality before law, acknowledgement of the 
judicial power, protection of the nationalities living with us”. 
50 László Trócsányi, Az alkotmányozás dilemmái [The dilemmas of the constitution-making], in 
(2014) HVG-ORAC, p. 79. 
51 See Drinóczi, op.cit., supra, note 41. The decisions of the CJEU are about the nobiliary titles 
and using of languages, including the use of names. 
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According to the other essential statements of the reasoning, the identity 
formation values are not created only as declared by the Fundamental 
Law. Moreover, these values are in effect as long as Hungary is a sovereign 
country. These thoughts give place for different interpretations again. The 
denial of the static nature of values forming constitutional identity results 
in the conclusion that the identity formation elements are permanently. 
From this perspective, the Fundamental Law can contain only a snapshot 
of the elements of identity summarized by the “constituent generation”.52 
According to another approach, the “personality of the Fundamental Law” 
is partly genetical, and partly added up by environmental capabilities. 
Consequently, the identity can be formed by the reactions to the 
environmental effects. In the light of the above the permanent change is 
natural.53 This thought is in accordance with the reasoning of the CC what 
is based on the historical evolution of the constitution and the identity 
interpretation is closely related to the national identity. The difficulties 
start when the CC declares that the constitutional identity cannot be 
waived by way of an international treaty – Hungary can only be deprived 
of its constitutional identity through the final termination of its 
sovereignty, its independent statehood. Consequently, this statement 
defines the further attributes of the constitutional identity as a sum of 
eternal, unchangeable values which can also break away from the text of 
the Fundamental Law.54 This part of the reasoning raises the question 
whether the values of the constitutional identity can be in contradiction 
with the future amendments to the constitution or even a new 
constitution? The abovementioned statement declares that the state can be 
deprived of these values only when it lost its sovereignty. Consequently, 
an amendment to the constitution or a new constitution cannot ignore 
these values even the sovereignty of the country remains intact. The CC 
attributed extraordinary importance to the concept of constitutional 
identity with this statement. 
                                                      
52 Gary J. Jacobsohn, Az alkotmányos identitás változásai [The Changing of the Constitutional 
Identity], in (2013) 1 Fundamentum, pp. 1-7. 
53 Lóránt Csink, Az Alaptörvény identitása – honnan hová? [The identity of the Fundamental 
Law – From where into which direction?], in J. Tóth (ed.), Tanulmányok Dr. Tóth Károly 
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professor Károly Tóth (2015) Tomus LXXVIII Acta Universitais Szegediensis. Acta Juridica et 
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54 Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) CC [109]. 
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The CC declares in the same paragraph that the sovereignty and the 
identity are closely connected to each other, so the two types of controls 
have to be examined with respect to each other. However, the reasoning 
does not contain the details of this connection and does not give a 
conceptual delimitation of the concepts. Because the identity and the 
sovereignty have many connection points it would be necessary to get a 
guidance interpretation in this regard from the CC. This question has 
special importance in the light of the approach as referring to the 
constitutional identity is in fact the more modern replacement of the 
principal of the sovereignty.55 However, we have to see that the modern 
theory of the sovereignty has not been clear yet in the 21st century, 
prescribing of its content – similarly to identity - is excessively difficult 
mostly in the context of the international cooperation. According to some 
approaches of the related literature, in the global aspects of the sovereignty 
the national sovereignty is divided, so it can be unfolded in its joint 
exercise within the integration and in international cooperation.56 
Accordingly, it is not inconsequential in which relation are we speaking 
about identity and sovereignty and what kind of functions are associated 
to these. 
Finally, the CC repeats its position regarding the e EUC Decision in 
question: “the joint exercise of powers under Article E) para. (2) of the 
Fundamental Law would violate human dignity, another fundamental 
right, the sovereignty of Hungary or its identity based on the country's 
historical constitution.” We have already mentioned the undetermined 
relation of the secondary law of the EU with the constitutions of the 
Member States.57 In relation with this problem we also cannot read a clear 
statement in the decision. The wording of “during the practice of its 
competence” does not specify the cases in which the CC will examine the 
EU law from the identity- or sovereignty control perspective. The other 
question that was not answered by the CC is the potential subjects of 
                                                      
55 Trócsányi, op.cit., supra, note 50, p. 72.: Furthermore, the concurring opinion of András 
Varga Zs. can be recalled which states that the protection of sovereignty of Hungary also 
means the protection of self-identity.  
56 Tímea Drinóczi, Állami szuverenitás és párbeszéd [National sovereignty and dialogue], in P. 
Takács (Ed.): Az állam szuverenitása – eszmény és/vagy valóság. The sovereignty of the state. 
Idea and/or reality (Budapest: Gondolat, 2015), p. 96. 
57 The Member States never gave up the priority of their legal system for the advantage of 
the EU law. See: Varga Zs., op.cit., supra, note 42. 
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examination, the acts of the EU that can be examined. The wording “joint 
exercise of competences based on the Article E) of the Fundamental Law” 
indicates an extraordinary wide frame which can include even the 
individual decisions of the EU organs, so we cannot specify what EU 
decisions will be examined by the CC in the future. 
 
5. The Relevance of the Case 
The CC was dealing for the first time in a majority decision with the 
doctrine of constitutional identity. The careful definition of the idea is new 
to the Hungarian public law and the clearing up of the related methods of 
constitutional interpretation were unfortunately adjourned. At the same 
time, the CC made multiple statements that might gain relevance in the 
future. In the future, the CC wishes to examine the idea of "constitutional 
identity" from the point of historical constitution and national identity - but 
for the success of this undertaking, the prudent clarification and 
convincing support of concepts and methodological frameworks will be 
unavoidable. Connecting of constitutional identity with the concept of 
sovereignty is less problematic, but even in this regard, there will be a need 
for the clarification of particular aspects of sovereignty. In the case of 
fundamental rights reservations, the more accurate formulation of 
arguments supporting such reservation is delayed. 
It is still an open question, in the case which EU legal acts and procedures 
can the CC refer to the concepts above, as well as whether it recognizes 
values beyond the Fundamental Law, norm hierarchy within the 
Fundamental Law that could bound the constitution amending power as 
well in the future. Accordingly, it is possible that the CC opened58 more 
questions than it answered. 
 
Appendix 
The Seventh Amendment to the Fundamental Law (28th of June 2018) 
incorporated into the text of the constitution many of the statements 
previously experessed by the Constitutional Court in Decision 22/2016. 
(XII. 5.) CC. According to the amendments, (a) the National Awoval (the 
                                                      
58 See: Nóra Chronowski, Attila Vincze, Önazonosság és európai integráció – az 
Alkotmánybíróság az identitáskeresés útján [Self-identity and European integration – the 
Constitutional Court on the way of identity-search], in (2017) 3 Jogtudományi Közlönola. 
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preamble) expresses that it is the fundamental duty of the state to protect 
the identity of the nation which is rooted in its historical constitution;  
(b) the new version of Article E) para. (2) of the Fundamental Law 
prescribes that the joint exercise of competences with the EU organs shall 
be in accordance with the fundamental rights and freedoms included in the 
Fundamental Law and may not limit the inalienable right of the country to 
rule its territorial integrity, its population and its form of government and 
the structure of state organs; (c) Article R) contains a new paragraph which 
prescribes that the protection of constitutional self-identity and of the 
Christian culture of the country is the duty of every state organ. Article 
XIV. of the Fundamental Law (which was not interpreted in detail, only 
mentioned by the CC in the above analysed decision) was also amended 
with provisions regarding the resettlement of foreigners, which is possible 
only based on individual claims. 
